Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 39
Issue 2 2006

Article 5

Theory in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent
Passage in the Territorial Sea
William K. Agyebeng

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Agyebeng, William K. (2006) "Theory in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea," Cornell International
Law Journal: Vol. 39: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol39/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Theory in Search of Practice:
The Right of Innocent Passage in the
Territorial Sea
William K. Agyebengt
Introduction .....................................................
I. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea - Down Memory
L an e ...... ..............................................
II. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea as Codified in the
LO SC ....................................................
A. The Regim e ...........................................
1. General Rules .....................................
2. Coastal States' Legislative Powers ...................
3. Rights and Duties of the Coastal State ...............
B. Innocent Passage of Different Types of Ships ...........
1. Ships with Special Characteristics...................
2. Merchant Ships ....................................
3. Warships ..........................................
C. Unresolved Issues .....................................
III. Innocent Passage Outside the Book .......................
A. Restriction on Innocent Passage in General ............
B. Environment Based Restriction ........................
C. Restriction on Innocent Passage of Warships ...........
C onclusion ......................................................

371
3 74
380
381
381
383
384
385
385
385
387
387
392
393
394
396
398

Introduction
Throughout the evolution of international law governing the oceans,
two theories have fought for mastery. The first theory is that all of humanity commonly owns the sea and therefore it is open to all for navigational
and other uses. Thus, no person or nation can validly restrict other individuals or countries from such use, by laying a claim of proprietorship over
the sea. This notion appears to be rooted in the belief that the geophysical
nature of the ocean itself resists any ownership claims over it.' Freedom of
navigation is the mantra of this doctrine. The second theory is based on
t LL.B. (Ghana); LL.M. candidate (Cornell Law School), expected 2006. This note
is dedicated to Sefah Agyebeng and Akua Ntiriwaa-my parents; and also to Phinna
Agoe-Sowah, for being an inspiration.
1. See, e.g., Erik M. Limpitlaw, Is International Environmental Law Waterproof?, 29
SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 185, 205 (2002) (Hugo Grotius, a leading international maritime
lawyer, believed that the ocean could not be divided by metes and bounds and any such
attempt was a "physical impossibility.").
39 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 371 (2006)
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the premise that the sea is amenable to ownership and whoever brings any
part of it under his dominion can then validly restrict its use. 2 The tension
between these two theories has shaped, and continues to shape, the development of the law of the sea. Central to the debate is the recognition (historically and presently) of the importance of marine navigation 3 as a vital
link between nations in terms of trade, commerce, and communication.
The principle of innocent passage is a compromise between these two
conflicting theories. After centuries of turbulent development, this principle appears to have crystallized through its codification in the Law of the
Sea Convention (LOSC). 4 The right of innocent passage is essential to
marine navigation and at present "[nlo one would seem to disclaim it. The
maritime States cherish it as one of the cornerstones of the law of the sea,
[and] the coastal States admit it as an unavoidable limitation to coastal
'5
State competence.
However, the exact scope and juridical nature of the right of innocent
passage is uncertain given contemporary coastal state practice. This
uncertainty is a reminder that treaty provisions are meaningless unless
viewed in light of state practice. Moreover, even if a state considers
adopted treaties to be binding, it is not uncommon for that state to ignore
or violate their provisions when it is in its best interest to do so.
International law is a legal regime that governs states that regularly
infringe its tenets and find disingenuous justifications for their self-serving
acts. In the words of one author, "[tihe function of international law is not
to invest States with legal regimes but to secure recognition of regimes con'6
trived by action of individual members of the community of nations.
Therefore, notwithstanding the extent of codification of international law,
it is ultimately accepted state practice that becomes instructive. The fluid
nature of international law is pointedly stressed by international judicial
dictum that:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these

co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of
common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot there7
fore be presumed.
2. See, e.g., Barbara Rhodes, Who "Owns" the North Pole?, in 90? NORTH, http://
members.tripod.com/90north/northpole.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2006) (describing
Canada's unchallenged claim of sovereignty over part of the Arctic Ocean).
3. See Limpitlaw, supra note 1, at 205 (describing the debate between freedom and
ownership regarding the ocean).
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC].
5. K. Hakapaa & EJ. Molenaar, Innocent Passage - Past and Present, 23 MARINE
POL'Y 131, 131 (1999).
6. D.P. O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the TerritorialSea, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
303, 304 (1971).
7. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A,) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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Indeed, there is no impenetrable shield of codified international law rules
and the law of the sea in particular. 8
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. told us that "[tihe life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." 9 If these hallowed words have any
persuasive force in the domestic law setting, then they must have greater
force with respect to international law. The rules of international law
develop from theoretical and normative indices that are recognized by a
majority of states as valid bases for a course of action. Over time, the scope
of these rules is defined through codification. The rules are then further
expanded through interpretation and application. Therefore, the development of international law is cyclical. Theory begets practice; practice
begets crystallized rules. As crystallized rules beget further practice, that
practice begets further theory. Not infrequently, practice deviates from its
parent theory, and the latter must of necessity mutate to incorporate the
former.
Consequently, international law is not static. It progresses to resolve
current challenges, while being constantly altered by state practice. The
rules of international law change as the conditions that gave rise to them
also change. 10 Likewise, the law of the sea "remains an active and dynamic
field, changing and growing as the interests of nations change."1 This
characteristic is most evident in regards to navigational rights, owing to
commercial and military concerns of maritime states juxtaposed with
security and other concerns of coastal states. 12
This note examines the theoretical right of innocent passage in the
territorial sea 13 matched against contemporary state practice. The law of
nations "rests on a general consensus of opinion... [and it] may be gradually modified, altered or extended, in accordance with the views of a con14
siderable majority of ... States, as [the] consensus of opinion develops."'
Consequently, this note seeks to match "logic" (codified international law
right of innocent passage) against "experience" (contemporary state practice), to ascertain the extent to which the latter deviates from the former,
and the implication of the deviation for the future development of this
right.
8. Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New
Millennium, 31 OCEAN DEVEL. & INT'L L. 7, 10 (2000).
9.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction Publishers 2005)

(1881).
10. Cf. John Wilkinson, The First Declarationof the Freedom of the Seas: The Rhodian
Sea Law, 2 OCEAN Y.B. 89, 90 (1980) (holding that the law remains unchanged as long as
the conditions that gave rise to the law remain unchanged).
11. Bowen L. Florsheim, Current Legislation and Decisions: Territorial Seas--3000
Year Old Question, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 73, 75 (1970).
12. See Joanna Mossop, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV 867, 867 (2005) (book review).
13. This right also exists in straits used for international navigation and what is
known as archipelagic waters. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES
RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 209, 281-90 (1996).

14. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A,) No. 10, at 34 (Sept. 7).
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The right of innocent passage "deserves study from both historical
and contemporary perspectives because of its fundamental importance as
the residual legal regime for securing transit of ships through sovereign
seas." 15 This note will explore this theme in three parts. Part I examines
the history and evolution of the right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea. Part II analyzes the regime of innocent passage under the LOSC. It
especially considers the interpretation and implementation challenges
posed by the LOSC provisions. Part III observes contemporary state practice as reflected mainly in national legislations.

I.

Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea - Down Memory Lane

Innocent passage implies that such passage is at the sufferance of the
state through whose coastal waters the right is exercised. For where no
sovereignty is exercised over a body of water by any state, navigation in it
would be passage simpliciter--without any consideration of its offensiveness or lack of it. For instance, the right of innocent passage has no usefulness with respect to navigation on the high seas since no state can validly
16
claim jurisdiction over this body of water.
The exercise of sovereign rights over portions of the sea, necessitating
the notion of innocent passage, has been the most controversial area in the
evolution of the law of the sea. One commentator pointedly remarked that:
The history of the Law of the Sea has been dominated by a central and persistent theme-the competition between the exercise of governmental
authority over the sea and the idea of the freedom of the seas. The tension
between these has waxed and waned through the centuries, and has reflected
the political, strategic and economic circumstances of each particular age.
When one or two great commercial powers have been dominant or have
achieved parity of power, the emphasis has lain upon the liberty of navigation and the immunity of shipping from local control ....

When, on the

other hand, great powers have been in decline or have been unable to impose
their wills upon smaller states, or when an equilibrium of power has been
attained between a multiplicity of states, the emphasis has lain upon the
protection and reservation of maritime resources,
and consequently upon
17
the assertion of local authority over the sea.
It appears that in antiquity, coastal states did not impose navigational
restrictions on the sea. Dated writers such as Ulpian and Celsus supported

this position. The former asserted mare quod natura omnibus patet-that
the sea is open to everybody by nature, and the latter stressed maris communem usum omnibus hominibus ut aeria-thatthe sea, like the air, is com-

15. F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the TerritorialSea, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625, 630 (1984).
16. See Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal
Challenges, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 267 (2005).
17. D.P. O'Connell, Transit Rights and Maritime Strategy, 123 J. RoYAL UNITED SERV.
INST. DEF. STUD. 11 (1978), quoted in Pirtle, supra note 8, at 36.
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mon to all mankind.1 8 More recently, Vattel observed that:
It is manifest that the use of the open sea, which consists in navigation and
fishing, is innocent and inexhaustible; that is, he who navigates, or fishes in
it, does no injury to any one, and that the sea, in these two respects, is
sufficient for all mankind ... since, every one being able to find in their state
of communion what was sufficient to supply their wants, to undertake to
render themselves sole masters of them, and exclude all others, would be to
deprive them, without reason, of the benefits of nature. 19
This point of view did not pass unchallenged. There has always been a
counterclaim that individuals can appropriate the sea. The Glossators,
who espoused Roman canon law, were perhaps the first to assert this position. 20 They propounded this counter theory by which they sought to
invest sovereign rights over the sea in the Roman Emperor. 2 1 However,
with the emergence of the ius gentium, or law of nations, the idea that the
sea existed for humankind's free access reclaimed prominence. 22 Justice
Joseph Story summarized this point of view in the Marianna Flora case
when he stated that "[ulpon the ocean, in time of peace, all possess an
entire equity. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the use of
all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative
23
there."
The Rhodians of the Hellinistic Age fought relentlessly on the side of
freedom of navigation to protect their maritime interests and in opposition
to a Mediterranean "hegemony." 24 This led to the promulgation of the
25
famous Rhodian Sea Law, which was enforced on the Island of Rhodes,
and is one of the earliest known comprehensive codes of the law of the
sea.

26

However, by the thirteenth century, the consensus among nations was
that a state might exercise jurisdiction over the body of water adjacent to
its shores. 27 In addition, the practice of feudalism and the immense "rights
and powers [of which] would naturally produce in the mind of the ruler
possessing them a sense of proprietorship of the things over which he exer18. See Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation- Its Legal History and Its Normative
MAR. L. & COM. 259, 261 (1975) [hereinafter Freedom of Navigation-Its Legal
History].
19. M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS: A WORK TENDING TO
DISPLAY THE TRUE INTEREST OF POWERS bk. I, ch. XXIII, § 281, at 185 (1829).
20. See Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AM. J.
INT'L L 465, 465 (1926).
Basis, 6 J.

21.

Id.

22. See id. at 466.
23. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825), quoted in Pirtle, supra
note 8, at 13.
24. See Wilkinson, supra note 10 at 91-92.
25. See William Tetley, Q.C., The General Maritime Law- The Lex Maritima (With a
brief reference to the ius commune in arbitrationlaw and the conflict of laws), 20 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 105, 109 (1994).
26. Florsheim, supra note 11, at 76.
27. RUTH LAPIDOTH, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

14 (1975) [hereinafter

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION].
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cised them," fostered the notion of restricted access to the sea. 28 In fact, at
different points in history, states have laid claim to vast expanses of the
sea. 2 9 For example, at the peak of their glory, Genoa and the Republic of
Venice laid claim to the Ligurian and Adriatic Seas, respectively. 30 Perhaps
the most notorious pretensions of ownership of the seas were Spain and
Portugal's fifteenth-century claims to almost the entirety of the oceans.
Pope Alexander VI, through his donationis Pontificiae (Papal bull) in 1493,
donated the Western and Eastern Hemispheres to Spain and Portugal,
respectively, by drawing an imaginary line from the Arctic Pole to the
31
Antarctic Pole!
Naturally, such sweeping claims did not pass unnoticed. For instance,
in response to a Spanish complaint against the voyage of Sir Francis Drake
to the Pacific, Queen Elizabeth I remarked that "[tihe use of the sea and air
is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people or
private man, for as much as neither nature nor regard of the public use
32
permitteth any possession thereof."
The seventeenth century witnessed substantial intellectual discourse
on the issue through the legal expositions of a Dutchman, Hugo Grotius,
fighting on the side of freedom of navigation, and an Englishman, John
Selden, arguing for restricted sea access. In his treatise supporting Dutch
trading interests in the East Indies, Grotius argued that it would be contrary to natural law to inhibit free navigation. 3 3 He justified his position
by noting that "the sea can in no way become the private property of any
one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use. Neither
can the shore become the private property of [anyone]." '3 4 Therefore, he
concluded that we should not prevent the free use of the oceans and that in
fact we are "bound to assist such navigation in whatever way we can, when
it can be done without any prejudice to ourselves." 35 On the other side,
Selden defended the British Monarch's proprietary claims to expanses of
the sea around the British Isles. Inspired by previous claims made by the
British and other states, he asserted "[tihat the Law of God, or the divine
36
Oracles of Holy Scripture, do allow a private Dominion of the Sea."
In the end, Grotius' open seas treatise appears to have triumphed over
Selden's closed seas treatise. Coastal states have recognized the freedom of
28.
29.
30.
31.

Fenn, supra note 20, at 469.
See Freedom of Navigation- Its Legal History, supra note 18, at 261.
See FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, supra note 27, at 14.
See id. For a brief background to this pretension to global sovereignty, see

Edward Gaylord Bourne, The Demarcation Line of Alexander VI: An Episode of the Period
of Discoveries, 1 YALE REV. 35 (1892).
32. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, supra note 27, at 15.
33. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERVM SivE DE IVRE QVOD BATAVIS COMPETIT AD INDICANA
COMMERCIA [THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO
TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE] 55 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., James
Brown Scott ed., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608) [hereinafter MARE LIBERVM].

34. Id. at 30.
35. Id. at 55.
36. JOHN SELDEN,

MARE CLAUSUM, SEU, DE DOMINIO MARIS [OF THE DOMINION, OR,
OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA] 27 (Marchamont Nedham trans., Arno Press Inc. 1972) (1652).
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the seas, with its necessary notion of freedom of navigation since the eighteenth century. 3 7 In the colorful words of James Brown Scott:
In this battle of books, to use the happy expression of Professor Nys, the
Dutch Scholar has had the better of his English antagonist. If it cannot be
said that Grotius wears his learning "lightly like a flower," the treatise of
Selden is, in comparison, over-freighted with it; the Mare Liberum is still an
open book, the Mare Clausum is indeed a closed one, and as flotsam or
jetsam on troubled waters [the former] rides
the waves, whereas its rival,
38
heavy and water-logged, has gone under.
The debate between open seas and closed seas proponents has created
two principles, namely, the concept of territorial sea and the right of innocent passage. Compromise, more than anything else, is the reason why
these principles are now firmly recognized in international law. The former principle was recognized contemporaneously as the notion of freedom
of the seas. But "[f]or nearly two centuries following the acceptance of
freedom of the seas, the questions of what areas of the sea were in fact
subject to national control and just what controls could be imposed contin39
ued to be debated."
The concept of territorial sea arose out of the need to suppress piracy
and to promote navigation and commerce among states. 40 This principle
permitted a state to extend its jurisdiction over the marginal waters abutting its coastline for security reasons as "a safety perimeter since it was
preferable to keep attacking enemies at sea rather than suffer [an] invasion
on land."4 1 In the words of Elihu Root:
The sovereign of the land washed by the sea asserted a new right to protect
his subjects and citizens against attack, against invasion, against interference and injury, to protect them against attack threatening their peace, to
protect their revenues, to protect their health, to protect their industries.
This is the basis and the sole basis on which is established
the territorial
42
zone that is recognized in the international law of today.
Conceptually, the territorial sea is an extension of the territorial land
mass. It is a natural prolongation of the land subsumed under the superjacent waters. Thus, over the centuries, nations have conceded that "[elvery
Prince, [whose] Country adjoyns to the Sea... has [some] portion of the
Sea belonging to him in property, as an [accession] of the Land, or appendant to it, or rather incorporated with it, like Veins and Arteries, integral
37. Freedom of Navigation- Its Legal History, supra note 18, at 268.
38. James Brown Scott, Introduction to MARE LIBERVM, supra note 33, at ix.

39. Florsheim, supra note 11, at 79 (citing Bernard G. Heizen, The Three-Mile Limit:
Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597, 602 (1959)).
40. Fenn, supra note 20, at 471.

41. W. L. Schachte, Jr., The History of the Territorial Sea from a National Security
Perspective, 1 TERRITORIAL SEAJ. 143, 148 (1990).
42. ELIHU ROOT, NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE: ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES 116 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds.,
1917).
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Parts of the [same] Body." 43 In fact, even Grotius, the champion of freedom of navigation, admitted that although the sea is common to all and
cannot be appropriated by a person, "if any part of [the sea] is by nature
susceptible of occupation, it may become the property of the one who
occupies it only so far as such occupation does not affect its common
44
use."
The conceptual basis of the territorial sea appears to be a misnomer
since the territorial sea seems not a natural projection of the territorial land
mass but a body of water that is a natural landward flow of the open seas.
However, O'Connell explains that with the development of the abstract theory of the state:
Territory ceased to be regarded as something owned, and came to be
regarded as a spatial area within which the faculties of sovereignty could be
exercised. Police powers could be exercised outside this spatial area to the
extent that international law permitted, and hence jurisdiction ceased to be
spatially coterminous with territory .... The philosophy that had initially

legitimized exclusive rights to the sea had been sapped, and it had left as a
residue the territorial sea, which was now explicable on quite different premises. No longer was
it necessary to regard the territorial sea as part of the
45
national domain.
Thus, in recent times, proponents of the territorial sea doctrine have
offered additional reasons to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the
territorial sea. Nations have asserted this right for health, safety and welfare reasons, 46 and concerns over pollution, customs control, and national
security. 4 7 These fears "reflect recognition that conduct in coastal waters
is inextricably linked with the protection and promotion of societal values
48
ashore."
From the 1930 Hague Codification Conference 4 9 through the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention 50 to the LOSC, coastal states have endorsed the
notion that the territorial sea concept is an established tenet in the law of
the sea. The LOSC permits the coastal state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the bed and subsoil of the sea up to a distance of twelve nautical
51
miles, measured from baselines along the coast, encircling the state.
43.

SIR PHILIP MEDOWS, OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DOMINION AND SOVEREIGNTY

OF THE SEAS: BEING AN ABSTRACT OF THE MARINE AFFAIRS OF ENGLAND

42 (Bell & Howell

Micro Photo Division, 1970) (1689).
44. MARE

LIBERVM,

supra note 33, at 30.

45. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 325.
46. Schacte, supra note 41, at 147.
47. Id. at 143.

48. Id. at 147.
49. See, e.g., League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International
Law, The Hague, Neth., 1930, Conferencefor the Codification of InternationalLaw: Bases
of Discussion, Supplement to Volume l--Territorial Waters, League of Nations Doc.
C.74(a) M.39(a).1929.V.
50. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone arts. 15-17, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 7477 U.N.T.S. 205.
51. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 3.
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The second principle that emerged from the friction between open
seas and closed seas doctrines is the right of innocent passage. It is "a
development concomitant to the emergence of coastal state sovereign concountrol over the territorial sea"5 2 arising "from the dialectic of claim and
53
terclaim in a world of few powerful actors and infinite resources.
The right of innocent passage promotes trade, commerce, and communication among nations. Accordingly, even though a coastal state can exercise juridical rights over its territorial sea, ships of foreign nations can
navigate through such sovereign waters as long as such navigation is nonprovocative. A state cannot deny this right because of interdependence
among countries and because a lot of states still continue to transport their
exports aboard ships. No single nation can claim to be so self-sufficient as
not to need resources from other states. In the words of Sir Philip Medows:
[As it is] a Way, [it is] common to the peaceable Traders of all Nations....
And this is [so] far from being a damage to any, that it is highly beneficial to
all; for as there is no Man [so self-sufficient], as not to need the continual
not, at some
help of another, [so] neither [is] there any Country, which does
54
time or other, need the Growth and Productions of another.
Grotius' Mare Liberum was instrumental in the development of the
right of innocent passage. He stated that this right is an "unimpeachable
axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the
spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to
travel to every other nation, and to trade with it."' 5 5 This passionate
defense of the right of innocent passage foreshadowed his later justification
of the slaying of the Amorites by the Israelites of the Mosaic Era. The Amorites denied innocent passage through their land to the Israelites. 5 6 Grotius argued that innocent passage was "a right which according to the Law
57
of Human Society ought in all justice to have been allowed."
Moreover, even Selden, an adamant supporter of the closed seas doctrine, conceded to the existence of the right of innocent passage: "[T]he
given to Strangers,
Offices of [humanity] require, that entertainment [be]
58
and that [inoffensive passage be] not denied them."
Indeed, the recognition of the right of innocent passage is self-evident
both in common sense and in practicality. Aside from the fact that interdependence among states makes the right of innocent passage imperative,
this right must exist because "[tihough freedom of navigation applies primarily to shipping on the high seas, it would have been useless and ineffectual if a right of access to and from the open sea and between different
52. Zou Keyuan, Innocent Passagefor Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice,29
OcE.J
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

DEv. & INT'L L. 195, 197 (1998).
Froman, supra note 15, at 689.
MEDOWS, supra note 43, at 6-7.
MARE LIBERVM, supra note 33, at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
SELDEN, supra note 36, at 123.
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parts of it had not been recognized as well."'5 9
The right of innocent passage is in effect a balance between the interests of maritime states and the interests of coastal states. The former lies
in the preservation of navigational freedoms while the latter resides in the
preservation of security interests. 60 In the words of Cameroonian Minister
Counselor Francis Ngantcha, this "delicate balance between the security
and other interests of the coastal State, and the interest of the international
community in free and unimpeded navigation in coastal waters, is therefore the backbone of the right of innocent passage." 6 1 It must be borne in
mind that depending on the circumstances, a maritime state may be a
coastal state, and a coastal state may be a maritime state, pursuing interests associated with such states. 6 2 This probable twist-of-fate factor fosters
the recognition of the right of innocent passage.
The right of innocent passage, therefore, exists as a limitation and an
exception to absolute coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea. It is
"the only exception of any importance" 63 and it "is not a 'gift' of the coastal
state to passing vessels but a limitation of its sovereignty in the interests of
international intercourse. '64 The interaction of the forces of closed seas
and open seas has produced the following result:
[These] parts of the [sea], thus [subject] to [the coastal] [state], are comprehended in its territory; no one can navigate them in [spite] of that nation.
But it cannot refuse [access] to [vessels] not [suspected], for innocent [uses],
without violating its duty; every proprietor being obliged to grant a [passage]
to [strangers], even by land, when it may be done without damage or
65
danger.

We have considered the historical antecedents and the theoretical
basis of the right of innocent passage. Part II will now examine the juridical scope of the right of innocent passage as codified in the LOSC.
II.

Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea as Codified in the LOSC

66
Most nations recognize the LOSC as the "constitution" of the oceans.
The LOSC is meant to settle all issues relating to the law of the sea. It

59. Freedom of Navigation- Its Legal History, supra note 18, at 259.

60. See id.
61. FAN c s

NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE

LAW OF THE SEA: THE CURRENT REGIME OF "FREE" NAVIGATION IN COASTAL WATERS OF THIRD

STATES 2 (1990).
62. Id. at 198.
63. Tullio Treves, Navigation, in 2 A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 835, 906
(Ren&-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991).

64. W.E. Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet
Law and Policy, 81 AMJ. INT'L L. 331, 346 (1987).
65. VATTEL, supra note 19, at 118.
66. See, e.g., Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Remarks: A Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 10, 1982), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-overview_convention.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).
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attempts to regulate the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea vis-avis the interests and sovereignty of the coastal state.
However, the provisions of the LOSC on innocent passage are not
flawless. Inexact and imperfect language often renders the provisions
vague or ambiguous. Moreover, even where the provisions are manifestly
clear, states will create ambiguity to suit their purposes. As a result, several
issues, which contemporary state practice would help to shape, have no
definite answers.
A.

The Regime

1.

General Rules

The right of innocent passage permits a ship of a foreign nation to
enter the coastal waters of another state if the navigation is peaceful and
not offensive. In the territorial sea, "ships of all States, whether coastal or
land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage." 6 7 The definition of passage poses no difficulty. The focus is on the purpose of navigation through
the territorial sea of the coastal state. Thus, a ship may pass through the
territorial sea without entering internal waters or calling at a port facility
outside such waters. Conversely, a ship may enter or proceed from internal
waters or call at a port facility outside such waters. 68
However, "ships are [almost never] allowed to 'hover' or cruise around
in the territorial sea, because, regardless of whether or not they are 'innocent', they would not be engaged in passage." 69 Therefore, passage is
required to be continuous and expeditious. 70 Yet, there is an exception to
this rule. Ships are permitted to "hover" in the territorial sea for the purpose of stoppage or anchorage incidental to ordinary navigation, or when
rendered necessary by force majeure, distress, or for rendering assistance to
71
persons or crafts in danger.
Innocence is negatively defined as passage that "is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." 72 Since this definition is open to subjective interpretation, the LOSC has a laundry list 7of3
activities, under article 19(2), that constitute non-innocent passage.
67. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 17.
68. See id. art. 18(1).
69. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 82 (1999).
70. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 18(2).
71. Id.
72. Id. art.19(1).
73. Article 19(2) of the LOSC states as follows:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of
the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State;
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Unfortunately, because of the inclusion of the word "propaganda" found in
the open-ended formulation of article 19(1), the term innocent passage is
both objective and subjective.
In addition, article 19 indicates that there is a presumption of innocence because ships are not required to show that their passage is innocent
before they are allowed to pass through the territorial sea. The complaining coastal state, therefore, has the burden to objectively establish that
the passage is non-innocent.
Yet, the language of the LOSC does not indicate whether a state must
prove factual non-innocence or whether notional non-innocence is sufficient. A state can meet the former standard by demonstrating that a ship
has engaged in any of the proscribed activities under article 19(2). Conversely, a state can meet the latter standard by showing that it has reason(s) to suspect that a ship will engage in any of the proscribed acts under
article 19(2).

74

The options available to a state depend on its interpretation of article
19. If the state believes that article 19 requires proof of factual non-innocence before it can act, then it may adopt a "wait-and-see" approach to prevent non-innocent passage. On the other hand, if the state interprets article
19 to allow actions based on evidence of notional non-innocence, the state
may resort to preemptive action to prevent reasonably suspected non-innocent passage. The chapeau of article 19(2) tends to favor factual non-innocence. However, as a consequence of fears of terrorist attacks, it would be
reasonable to assume that states would interpret article 19 as permitting
them to prevent perceived non-innocent passage by simply establishing
75
notional non-innocence.
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary
to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
0) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any
other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(I) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
74. See, e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text.
75. Indeed, in one reported incident, the Indonesian government turned away the
Lusitania Expresso, a Portuguese registered ferry, from its territorial waters in 1992.
The ferry, carrying human rights activists, was headed to East Timor to protest against
human rights violations in the region and to highlight the question of self-determination
for the East Timorese people. See Donald R. Rothwell, Coastal State Sovereignty and Innocent Passage: The Voyage of the Lusitania Expresso, 16 MARINE POL'Y 427, 427 (1992). The
human rights activists had not yet demonstrated when the Indonesian authorities
turned the ship away. But those acts would have violated article 19(2)(d) and thus rendered the passage non-innocent. Therefore, even though this ship was not a terrorist
threat, the incident illustrates a state's willingness to take preemptive measures to prevent the occurrence of non-innocent passage.
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Coastal States' Legislative Powers

There has never been absolute freedom of navigation through the territorial sea. Selden pointedly remarked that "it is [most] evident from the
[customs] of all times, that free passage (as they call it) is wont ever to [be
so] limited by Princes in their [tlerritories, that it is permitted or prohibited, according to the various concernments of the [plublick [sic]
[g]ood. ''7 6 Today, the right of innocent passage no longer exists at the
pleasure of sovereigns. The LOSC, which vests the right of regulation to
coastal states, limits the right of innocent passage.
Through laws and regulations, a coastal state may protect its interests
in the territorial sea. 7 7 Such interests include the safety of navigation and
regulation of maritime traffic; protection of cables, pipelines, and navigational aids; the conservation and preservation of marine environment and
its living resources; the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution,
marine scientific research, and hydrographic surveys; and customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary concerns. 78 Regulatory measures do not apply to
the design, construction, manning or equipment of ships, other than in
accordance with international standards. 7 9 Yet, coastal states require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage to comply with their
laws and regulations. 80
Additionally, a ship may not exercise the right of innocent passage in
all parts of the territorial sea. The coastal state is mandated to direct foreign ships passing through its territorial sea to use sea-lanes and to observe
any traffic separation scheme in force. 8 1 The designation of such schemes,
however, should reflect the recommendations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), together with density of traffic, special characteristics of ships, and any channels customarily used for international
82
navigation.
The LOSC does not specify whether a ship's refusal to obey a coastal
state law or regulation, such as using sea-lanes, renders the passage noninnocent. 83 However, by defining non-innocent passage with reference to
the interests of the coastal state, the violations of coastal state laws and
regulations would cause the passage to be non-innocent (at least in the
perception of the coastal state) since such an infraction is clearly provocative and offensive toward the coastal state.
Then again, there is no doubt that articles 19(2) and 21 give the
coastal state wide latitude to judge passage as being non-innocent based on
its whims. 8 4 Terms like "peace," "good order," and "security" are highly
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

supra note 36, at 124.
See LOSC, supra note 4, art. 21.
Id. art. 21(1).
Id. art. 21(2).
Id. art. 21(4).
Id. art. 22(1).
Id. art. 22(3).
See id.art. 21.
See id.
arts. 19(2), 21.
SELDEN,
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fluid and susceptible to varying interpretations despite the attempt of the
LOSC drafters to inject objective interpretation.
3.

Rights and Duties of the Coastal State

If the coastal state is vested with the power to regulate innocent passage, then the coastal state, as a necessity, must also have the right to
enforce these rules. One right implies the other. The LOSC permits the
coastal state to take essential steps to prevent non-innocent passage in its
territorial sea.85 Specifically, the coastal state may take necessary measures to prevent any violations associated with the admission of ships to its
86
internal waters or call at a port facility outside its internal waters.
Additionally, article 25 strongly implies that a ship's violation of the
rules and regulations of the coastal state renders the ship's passage noninnocent. 8 7 However, neither article 25 nor any other LOSC provision
instructs the coastal state as to what it can do to prevent non-innocent
passage. Accordingly, coastal states have complete and arbitrary control
over preventive measures. Nevertheless, there is one limitation on this
enforcement power. The coastal state cannot levy charges upon a foreign
ship simply because of its presence in the territorial sea.8 8 Yet, even such a
constraint in theory, does not limit the coastal state's ability to do so since
the restriction employs the use of the hortatory term "may," instead of the
mandatory term "shall."8 9
Coastal states also have the power to suspend innocent passage in
specified areas of the territorial sea. 90 The LOSC does not specify the
upper limit of such a suspension. 9 1 Consequently, a coastal state can
impose a temporary suspension of innocent passage in parts of the territorial sea that has the effect of permanent exclusion since the coastal state's
decision with respect to the duration of the suspension cannot be reviewed.
The only limitations are that the coastal state can only impose these suspensions to uphold its security and that the suspensions cannot be dis92
criminatory, in theory or in practice.
However, the coastal states' legislative and enforcement powers are not
writ large. The LOSC preserves the traditional delicate balance between
freedom of navigation and restricted access. Thus, notwithstanding the
extensive regulatory rules it may have, the coastal state cannot adopt measures that have the "practical effect of denying or impairing the right of
innocent passage" through its territorial sea. 93 The coastal state also has a
negative duty not to discriminate between ships on the basis of nationality
85. Id. art. 25.
86. Id. art. 25(2).
87. See id. art. 25
88. See id. art. 26.
89. Id. art. 26(2).
90. Id. art. 25(3).
91. See generally LOSC, supra note 4 (indicating there is no such upper limit to
suspension).
92. Id. art. 25(3).
93. Id. art. 24(1)(a).
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or cargo. 94 The coastal state also has a positive duty to "give appropriate
to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its
publicity to any danger
95
territorial sea."
The LOSC is unclear as to whether this positive duty arises only with
respect to actual knowledge of the existence of any danger to navigation or
whether coastal state responsibility may be triggered by imputed or constructive knowledge. On this point it is instructive to note that the International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel found a coastal state liable for
damage arising from a danger in its territorial waters that it should have
reasonably known about.9 6 The court maintained that proof of such
knowledge "may be drawn from9 7inferences of fact, provided that they leave
no room for reasonable doubt.
However, notwithstanding such an interpretation, it is unlikely that a
coastal state will have to pay reparation for damage resulting from its failure to warn about dangers in its territorial waters. This is because the
LOSC does not have any enforcement mechanism.
B. Innocent Passage of Different Types of Ships
1.

Ships with Special Characteristics

Certain ships, including nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying
hazardous substances, pose grave environmental concerns to the states in
whose waters they traverse. Such ships must carry documents and will
have to observe special precautionary measures established by international agreements. 98 Thus, while the true scope of the regime of innocent
passage for such ships has yet to be determined, coastal states presently
may require these ships (including tankers) to confine their passage to designated sea-lanes. 99
2.

Merchant Ships

Under certain circumstances, a coastal state has civil or criminal jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships and government ships operated for
commercial purposes in its territorial waters. The general international
law rule is that the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over incidents
occurring aboard a ship. However, the coastal state can make arrests or
impose fines for civil infractions' 0 0 that occur while the ship is passing
through the coastal state's territorial waters.' 0 ' For instance, a coastal
state can levy pilotage charges or fine a ship for damaging navigational
aids or cables.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. art. 24(1)(b).
Id. art. 24(2).
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 l.CJ. 4 (Apr. 9).
Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
LOSC, supra note 4, art. 23.
Id. art. 22(2).
Id. art. 28(3).
See id. art. 28(2).
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The coastal state can exercise civil jurisdiction over in rem maritime
claims but not for in personam actions. The coastal state has no power to
stop or divert the course of a ship in its territorial sea so as to exercise civil
jurisdiction over a person aboard the ship. 10 2 Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Arrest of Ships reaffirms this limitation by stating that "[a] ship
may only be arrested in respect of a maritime claim but in respect of no
other claim."'1 3 However, the "without prejudice" formulation in article
28(3) of the LOSC suggests that a coastal state may arrest or levy execution
10 4
of judgments on foreign ships for other civil claims.
With respect to criminal jurisdiction, it seems that the coastal state
can exercise full authority upon foreign merchant ships proceeding from
its internal waters to its territorial sea. 10 5 However, the coastal state's
criminal jurisdiction is limited if ships are merely passing through the territorial sea without entering internal waters or calling at a port facility.
The coastal state can exercise full jurisdiction under any circumstance if
the offense disturbs "the peace of the country or good order of the territorial sea" 10 6 and the master of the ship or operatives of the flag state have
requested the coastal state to assume criminal jurisdiction, or if the coastal
10 7
state is attempting to prevent drug trafficking.
Coastal states have jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard foreign
merchant ships passing through its territorial waters with very few restrictions. Under article 27(1) of the LOSC, a coastal state has wide latitude to
assume such jurisdiction since it is only the coastal state that can determine whether the consequences of a crime affect the coastal state or
whether the crime is a type that disturbs its peace or good order.' 0 8 Thus,
a coastal state can exercise a high degree of subjectivity in its analysis and
act arbitrarily in its determinations- -a good recipe for unilateralism. 10 9
Theoretically, a coastal state cannot assume jurisdiction over every
crime committed aboard a foreign merchant ship in its territorial waters.
In reality, however, that is not the case. Even in situations where the transgression occurs before the ship enters the territorial sea (and thus article
27(5) of the LOSC forbids the coastal state from assuming jurisdiction),
the coastal state can still intervene and assume authority over the ship if
the coastal state regards the crime as one that violates the rules regarding
its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or rules that protect and preserve the
marine environment." 0
102. Id. art. 28(1).
103. International Convention on Arrest of Ships art 2(2), Mar. 12, 1999, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.188/6, at 8, 10 (Mar. 19, 1999).
104. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 28(3).
105. Id. art. 27(2).
106. Id. art. 27(l)(b).
107. Id. art. 27(1).
108. See id. art. 27(1)(a)-(h).
109. See id.
110. Id. art. 27(5).
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Warships

Article 32 of the LOSC provides traditional immunity for warships and
other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes. Article 29
of the LOSC narrowly defines warships as:
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks,
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an
officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.
Accordingly, a ship belonging to an insurgent, nationalist, or rebel
movement and used for warfare, does not qualify as a warship under the
LOSC. This is because the ship does not belong to a state, is not manned
by a crew under regular armed forces discipline, and is not under the command of a duly commissioned officer whose name appears on the service
1 11
list.
A coastal state has no civil or criminal jurisdiction over foreign warships. The coastal state can only demand that such ships leave its territorial sea. 1 2 However, it is unclear as to what actions a coastal state may
take if the warship fails to obey the order. 1 3 The only certainty is that the
flag state is obliged to reimburse the coastal state for any loss or damage
1 14
resulting from the noncompliance of the warship.
The right of innocent passage is not uniform. The nature of the ship
and its navigational purpose determine the incidents- -rights, privileges
and responsibilities- -associated with it. The LOSC "seeks to maintain a
balance between the right of a coastal state to enact appropriate laws and
regulations dealing with innocent passage and the maintenance of the right
in instances of overbearing coastal [sitate laws." 1 15 However, the balance
1 16
appears to weigh in favor of coastal state regulation.
C.

Unresolved Issues

There are several provisions in the LOSC addressing innocent passage
that lead to various interpretations. For example, coastal states can interpret and apply article 19(1) to prohibit several activities not listed under
article 19(2). Moreover, article 19(2)(h) indicates that "willful and serious
111. Id. art. 29. Article 20 of the LOSC requires that submarines navigate on the
surface of the territorial sea while showing their flag.
112. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 30.
113. Article 30 of the LOSC states that if a warship ignores the regulations and laws
of the coastal state regarding passage through its territorial waters, then the coastal state
may "require it to leave the territorial sea immediately." However, the LOSC does not
indicate what means the coastal state may take to effectuate its order to vacate.
114. LOSC, supra note 4, art. 31.
115. See Rothwell, supra note 75, at 433.
116. See Froman, supra note 15, at 657 (noting that whenever a foreign ship can exercise the right of innocent passage, the danger of non-innocent passage exists, and suggesting that as a result, the burden of proving non-innocent passage rests on the
regulating coastal state, which therefore must enact clear and objective regulations).
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pollution" can render passage non-innocent. 117 Willful speaks of volition.
However, the gravity of the "pollution" that would render passage noninnocent is unclear. The word "serious" is a relative term, and its meaning
will thus depend on the coastal state's interpretation.
Another contentious issue is the preservation of the marine environment and its resources. 1 18 The coastal state must balance this concern
with its obligation to permit innocent passage. This balance is especially
problematic for states with ecologically sensitive marine environments and
marine protected areas. 119 One proposed solution is to regulate speed,
anchorage, and the imposition of routing measures in such areas. 120 However, there is no uniform guidance or consensus as to how to resolve this
issue.
Additionally, coastal states must deal with ships that are carrying
nuclear or other highly hazardous material. The issue here is whether the
mere presence of these ships in the territorial sea constitutes non-innocent
passage. A coastal state in favor of this interpretation can argue that any
spillage will have grave ecological damage, such as permanent radioactive
contamination, to its marine environment. 12 1 Moreover, there are no sal122
vage measures in the event of a spill of these noxious substances.
Ships carrying casks of plutonium are the greatest concern. "A minuscule amount will cause fatal cancer, and if a transport accident occurred,
plutonium could be released to the environment and would remain a
deadly contaminant for tens of thousands of years."'1 23 In addition, there is
the specter of the so-called "leper ships," that is, ships in distress or ships
whose mere presence in the territorial sea pose grave threats to the marine
environment owing to their unseaworthiness.t 24
117. Article 19(2)(h) of the LOSC states that "[p]assage of a foreign ship shall be
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in
the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: .. .(h) any act of wilful
and serious pollution contrary to this Convention."
118. See LOSC, supra note 4, p t . xii.
119. A marine protected area is defined as "[any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain,
together with its overlying waters and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural
features, which has been reserved by legislation to protect part or all of the enclosed
environment." Resolutions 17.38 and 19.46 of the IUCN General Assembly, in WORLD
COMM'N ON PROTECTEED AREAS, WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, GUIDELINES FOR MARINE
PROTECTED AREAS annex 4 (1999), available at http://app.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/

PAG-003.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).
120. Fabio Spadi, Navigation in Maritime Protected Areas: National and International
Law, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 285, 288-89 (2000).
121. Jon Van Dyke, The Legal Regime GoverningSea Transportof UltrahazardousRadioactive Materials, 33 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 77, 78 (2002).
122. Id.
123. Jon Van Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium under International Law, 24
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 399, 399 (1993).
124. For an analysis of the controversy surrounding the status of such ships under
the LOSC, see Christopher F. Murray, Note, Any Port in a Storm? The Right of Entry for
Reasons of Force Majeure or Distress in the Wake of the Erika and the Castor, 63 OHio ST.
L.J. 1465 (2002). It is understandable that coastal states are wary of the presence of
such ships in their territorial sea. However, the LOSC innocent passage provisions do
not appear to permit states to keep out such ships from their territorial sea. Neverthe-
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There is also the lingering issue of whether the coastal state can
require foreign ships passing through its territorial sea to carry equipment
that would enable the coastal state to monitor the ship's movement. Some
commentators opine that no LOSC provision prevents the coastal state
from imposing such a measure. 125 Yet it is doubtful whether the LOSC
permits the characterization of a foreign ship's passage in the territorial sea
as non-innocent if it fails to carry such equipment as required by the
coastal state.
With respect to foreign submarines, the convention requires them to
navigate on the surface while in the territorial sea. Indeed, "[tlhis rule has
been accepted for as long as submarines have been used as naval vessels." 126 However, it is unclear whether simply violating this custom
would deprive the submarine the right of innocent passage. Several commentators have argued that since the rule on submarines is not listed
under article 19, which lists non-innocent activities, submerged navigation
only violates coastal state laws and regulations without rendering passage
non-innocent. 12 7 According to Froman, "[tihe drafters could easily have
included [the submarine] provision in the [article 19] list of non-innocent
activities. The failure to do so indicates the drafters' intention not to make
12 8
surface operation a requirement of innocence for submarines."'
However, this conclusion is perplexing. The incorporation of the rule
in another article does not automatically make such navigation innocent.
Froman's observation tends to uphold absolute formalism without regard
to the purpose of the rule. Submarines are crafts of stealth. They are
designed to navigate undetected. They are used mainly for military purposes to collect intelligence. Submerged navigation bears the mark of
secrecy and thus carries the attribute of high suspicion. Accordingly, submerged navigation can be perceived as having a non-innocent purpose.
The negotiations that preceded the adoption of the LOSC are responsible for these unsolved issues. The patronization of polarized interests
between the maritime powers and coastal states characterized these negotiations. While the former pushed for greater navigation freedoms, the latter
advocated for constrained mobility. 1 29 The marine powers' desires to control the seas to carry out their military operations and to enhance the status of their merchant fleets were motivating factors in their quest for
unrestricted freedom of navigation. 130 Theoretically, freedom of navigaless, it is arguable that non-innocent passage occurs if the ship is in search of a dumpsite
for its noxious cargo. On this point, see Elaine B. Weinstein, The Impact of Regulation of
Transport of Hazardous Waste on Freedom of Navigation, 9 INT'LJ. MAR. & COASTAL L. 135,
141 (1994).
125. See John A. Knauss & Lewis M. Alexander, The Ability and Right of Coastal States
to Monitor Ship Movement: A Note, 31 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 377, 379 (2000).
126. CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 90-91.
127. Treves, supra note 63, at 927-29; Froman, supra note 15, at 663.
128. Froman, supra note 15, at 663.
129. Yann-huei (Billy) Song, China and the Military Use of the Ocean, 21 OCEAN DE.
& INT'L L. 213, 215 (1990).
130. See Jens Evensen, UNCLOS: Origin and Process of Negotiation, in TOWARD A NEW
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORDER 1, 3 (Finn Laursen ed., 1982).
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tion equally protects the rights of all states. Nevertheless, in practice, this
doctrine favors greatly the interests of the maritime powers, especially with
respect to military uses of the ocean. 13 ' The coastal states, aware of the
practical realities of freedom of navigation, revolted against the old
regime. 132 In the words of Pirtle:
A combination of scientific discoveries of new oceanic resources and rapid
technological developments that enhanced capabilities for exploitation of
those resources . . . operated to weaken and eventually invalidate the

assumption that ocean resources were a "collective good." In consequence,
the classical regime of freedom of the seas, which was rooted in this ancient
assumption, ceased13to3 be viewed by coastal states as being natural, equitable, or immutable.
The confrontation of interests between the maritime powers and
coastal states was most evident with respect to the issue of innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea. The debate turned on whether such
ships had to notify the coastal state prior to passage and whether such
ships required prior authorization before entering the territorial sea. Presently, the LOSC does not expressly require prior notification or authorization. Therefore, coastal states making such demands are violating the
LOSC. Arguably, prior notification is less objectionable than prior authorization since the latter implies that innocent passage does not exist for warships while the former merely suggests diplomacy and courtesy.
In reality, warships have weapons and ammunition aboard. Consequently, coastal states have a legitimate reason to consider the presence of
warships in their territorial sea as a threat to their security. As Florsheim
points out: "[u]nlike the situation of merchant vessels, [in the case of warships] there is no commercial interest involved and there may be danger at
times to the nation whose waters are being used." 13 4 The warship issue
heavily dominated the negotiations leading to the adoption of the LOSC.
One observer summed up the controversy by stating that:
Many delegations were engaged on both sides of this issue during the general debates. All the debates proved that there was no middle ground
between the antagonists. For that reason, no accommodation of views was
possible through the medium of negotiation.- In the closing days of the Conference, Gabon offered a formal amendment to Article 21 to allow coastal
states to require prior authorization or notification for passage of warships
through the territorial sea. This proposal, of course, was tenaciously
opposed by the maritime states, and in the end, the amendment was withdrawn (partially in response to a plea by the Conference President for the
withdrawal of all formal amendments to better enhance consensus) in favor
of a proposal to add a reference to "security" to the provision in Article
21(1)(h), which gives coastal states the authority to enact laws regarding
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary measures. To permit a coastal state
131. Pirtle, supra note 8, at 8.
132.
MARINE
133.
134.

Barry Buzan, The Coastal State Movement, in TOWARD A NEW INTERNATONAL
ORDER 15, 16 (Finn Laursen ed., 1982).
Pirtle, supra note 8, at 29.
Florsheim, supra note 11, at 92.
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to enact laws preventing infringement of security regulations would give
such states extremely broad regulatory powers in the territorial sea-not
necessarily limited even to warships. This proposal was even more strongly
resisted. It therefore appeared imminent that the issue would go to a vote in
the plenary. At the last minute, however, the sponsors of the proposal
agreed to withdraw it in favor of a statement by the President of the Conference, on the record, that its withdrawal was "without prejudice to the rights
of coastal states to adopt measures to safeguard their security
interests, in
35
accordance with articles 19 and 25 of this Convention."'
This statement, taken out of context, suggests that the Conference
President was stating his legal opinion on the effect of the withdrawal of
the proposed amendment. However, the President was only voicing the
resolution of the sponsors of the proposal. 13 6 His statement cannot be
taken as an invitation to restrict innocent passage of warships in the terri13 7
torial sea because the law does not support or justify this restriction.
Both articles, alluded to by the sponsors of the proposed amendment,
do not support any preconditions for the innocent passage of warships. It
is only when such ships engage in any of the proscribed activities listed
under article 19 that their passage is rendered non-innocent. Moreover,
article 25 only permits a temporary suspension of the right of innocent
passage for security reasons and does not require warships to notify or
receive prior authorization by the coastal state. Any other interpretation
would suggest that the mere presence of foreign warships in the territorial
sea is an offensive conduct. The claim that articles 19 and 25 reinforce the
idea that there is a requirement of prior notification or authorization is
"valid only for those States whose opinion it expresses."' 138
However, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of innocent
passage of warships suggest that there is dissent among the nations and
many coastal states do not consider themselves bound by the LOSC provisions on innocent passage of warships. Consequently, the matter is far
from settled, 1 39 and "there seems to be a general sense that the question is,
135. Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III Environment,
46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 112 (1983).

136. The President of the Conference announced that:
Although the sponsors of the amendment .. .had proposed [it]
with a view to
clarifying the text of the draft convention, in response to the President's appeal
...they have agreed not to press it to a vote. They would, however, like to
reaffirm that their decision is without prejudice to the rights of coastal states to

adopt measures to safeguard their interests, in accordance with articles 19 and
25 of the draft convention.
Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Remarks in plenary session on April 24 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.61/SR.176
(1982).
137. Indeed, "President Koh has since stated in public that, in his view, the right of
warships to innocent passage was confirmed by the Conference." Thomas A. Clingan,
Jr., An Overview of Second Committee Negotiations in the Law of the Sea Conference, 63 OR.
L. REv. 53, 64-65 (1984).

138. Treves, supra note 63, at 934.
139. See Erik Franckx, Innocent Passageof Warships: Recent Developments in US- Soviet
Relations, 14 MARINE POL'Y 484, 484 (1990).
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for all practical purposes, best left without a clear answer. '140 Having
examined the innocent passage regime under the LOSC, we will now turn
to contemporary state practice.
III.

Innocent Passage Outside the Book

As a result of either the flexible and often inconclusive LOSC provisions on innocent passage or the ideological turmoil that preceded the
signing of the LOSC, coastal states have not uniformly interpreted and
applied innocent passage as outlined in the LOSC.' 4 1 This note will now
examine state practice, beginning with a discussion of the practice of the
United States (the only superpower) and the Russian Federation (a recently
14 2
retired superpower). After years of inconsistent practice by both states,
sometimes marked by open confrontation between them, 143 the United
States and the Russian Federation finally adopted the Uniform Interpretation 14 4 of the innocent passage regime of the LOSC in 1989. Although
these rules were primarily intended to settle questions regarding innocent
passage between the two nations, the two countries believed that the Uniform Interpretation would be a blueprint for the rest of the world to
follow. 14 5

Article 2 of the Uniform Interpretation provides that all ships, including warships, have the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, without prior notification or authorization. 1 46 To minimize any potential
confrontation, article 8 requires that issues arising with respect to passage
47
of ships through the territorial sea be settled through diplomatic means. 1
Article 4 also mandates that the coastal state give the foreign ship an
opportunity "to clarify its intentions or correct its conduct within a reason140. CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 90.
141. State practice forming the basis of the discussion in this part of the note is based
on declarations made by states upon signature or ratification of the LOSC and national
legislation published in the U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and
Office of Legal Affairs' Law of the Sea Bulletin, availableat http://www.un.org/depts/los/
doalos-publications/los bult.htm, and the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs' Limits in the Seas, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/c16065.htm. The caveat is that some of these laws
may have been amended or even repealed at the time of the publication of this note. It
has been difficult to ascertain the most current state of the cited national legislations.
The reader should be cautioned as to possible amendment or repeal subsequent to the
date of publication.
142. See Franckx, supra note 139, at 484, 485.
143. On two occasions, March 13, 1986 and February 12, 1988, the Russian Federation reacted sharply to the presence of two US navy ships, the USS Yorktown and the
USS Caron, in its territorial sea. On the second occasion, Russian ships bumped the two
American ships. Id. at 485.

144. Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 14 L. SEAs BULL. 13 (1989).

145. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 228.
146. Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, supra note 144, art. 2.
147. Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Pas-

sage, supra note 144, art. 8.
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1 48
ably short period of time."
The agreement appears to be keeping the peace between these two
nations. However, its effect on the rest of the world is doubtful since
coastal states continue to pursue undue restrictions on the right of innocent passage, which the LOSC does not support. One commentator reinforces this latter point by noting that "[ais state practice evidences, this
position of the major powers could be regarded as reflecting wishful think49
ing rather than existing customary international law."'

A.

Restriction on Innocent Passage in General

Undoubtedly, a foreign ship has a right to innocent passage. However,
at least in one case this assertion may not hold true. Section 13 of the
Maritime Zones of Maldives Act No. 6/96 states that "[slave such vessels
engaged in innocent passage compatible with international laws, no vessel
shall enter the territorial sea of Maldives except in accordance with the laws
and regulations of Maldives."' 5 0 While this provision does not contradict
the right of innocent passage, section 14 of the same statute states that
"[n]o foreign vessel shall enter the exclusive economic zone of Maldives
except with prior authorization from the Government of Maldives in accordance with the laws of Maldives."' 15 1
It is very difficult to reconcile these two provisions. The purpose of
section 14 is to prevent unauthorized fishing in the EEZ. However, it is
unduly overbroad since it denies the existence of freedom of navigation in
the EEZ, which includes the territorial sea. Even if one concedes that section 14 does not apply to the territorial sea, the geophysical nature of
Maldives, an archipelago, dictates that a ship can only access its territorial
sea via the EEZ. The section 14 restriction on passage through the EEZ,
which encompasses the territorial sea, violates the LOSC and all the tenets
of freedom of navigation.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also imposes restrictions on the right of
innocent passage. The Kingdom maintains that "innocent passage does
not apply to its territorial sea where there is a route to the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone which is equally suitable as regards navigational
52
and hydrographic features."'

148. Uniform Interpretation of Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, supra note 144, art. 4.
149. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Innocent Passageby Warships: A Reply to ProfessorJuda, 21
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 447, 447 (1990).
150. Maldives: Maritime Zones of Maldives Act No. 6/96, § 13, 41 L. SEAS BULL. 17
(1999) [hereinafter Maldives].
151. Id.
152. Status of U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Saudi Arabia: Declaration
Made Upon Ratification, 31 L. SEAs BULL. 10 (1996) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia].
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B. Environment Based Restriction
Many coastal states have passed legislations to preserve the marine
environment. Because these statutes impact the right of innocent passage,
we now consider a few of these legislations.
As previously noted, article 19(2)(h) of the LOSC provides that willful
and serious pollution committed by a ship renders its passage non-innocent. Yet, the LOSC does not define the "serious" requirement, even though
an ordinary meaning interpretation suggests that the pollution must be of a
grave magnitude before it can be considered serious. However, several
states have eliminated altogether the requirement of "serious" pollution in
their domestic laws and regulations. For instance, under Polish 15 3 and
Croatian 15 4 laws, an act of deliberate or willful pollution of the marine
environment renders passage non-innocent. Under these two laws, the
magnitude of the pollution is inconsequential.
In the case of Bahamas' 5 5 and Belize, 156 passage is non-innocent if the
act of polluting is likely to cause damage to the state, its resources, or
marine environment. The overriding consideration is simply the likelihood of damage. Iranian law 15 7 is even more restrictive. It removes the
mens rea requirement by stipulating that passage is non-innocent if a ship
passing through its territorial waters engages in any acts of pollution of the
marine environment contrary to Iranian laws. There is no requirement
that the act of pollution be willful.
Countries impose the most restrictions on nuclear-powered ships and
158
Pakiships carrying ultra hazardous substances. For example, Djibouti,
16 1
1 60
59
and South Korea 16 2
the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Malta,
stan,'
require prior notification from such ships before the ships enter their terri153. Poland: Act Concerning the Maritime Areas of the Polish Republic and the Maritime Administration art. 9(8) (Mar. 21, 1991), 21 L. SEAS BULL. 66, 68-69 (1992).
154. Crotia: The Maritime Code art. 24(8), 42 L. SEAS BULL. 26, 32 (2000) [hereinafter
Croatia].
155. Bahamas: An Act (No. 37 of 1993) Respecting the Territorial Sea, Archipelagic
Waters, Internal Waters, and the Exclusive Economic Zone art. 5, 31 L. SEAS BULL. 33
(1996).
156. Belize: An Act to Make Provision with Respect to the Territorial Sea, Internal
Waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Belize art. 11 (Jan. 24, 1992), 21 L. SEAS
BULL. 11 (1992).
157. Iran (Islamic Republic of): Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of
Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea, 24 L. SEAS BULL. 10 (1993) [hereinafter Iran].
158. Republic of Djibouti: Office of the President of the Republic, Law No. 52/AN/78
Concerning the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the
Maritime Boundaries, and Fishing (1979), reprinted in ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE EcoNOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 111, 112 (1986). See ROACH,

supra note 13, at 273.
159. Pakistan: Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act (1976), reprinted in U.N.
LEGISLATIVE SERIES, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA

85-86, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, U.N. Sales No. E/F.80.V.3 (1980).
160. Malta: Declarations Made Upon Ratification of the Convention, 25 L. SEAS BULL.
15, 16 (1994) [hereinafter Malta].
161. United Arab Emirates: Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 in Respect of the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones of the United Arab Emirates (Oct. 17, 1993), 25 L. SEAS BULL.
94, 95 (1994) [hereinafter U.A.E.].
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torial sea. In addition, Egypt, 16 3 Oman, 164 Iran,'165 Yemen, 166 Saudi Ara-

bia, 167 Malaysia, 168 Maldives, 16 9 and Seychelles 170 further require prior
notification and permission or authorization for the passage of such ships
in their territorial waters. Moreover, Romania1 71 and Lithuania 17 2 prohibit
altogether the passage of ships carrying nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction.
The transboundary transport of hazardous waste has generated negative reactions. For example, in response to the Khian Sea incident where a
foreign ship deceived and dumped waste on an Haitian beach, 1 73 the Haitian government has strictly prohibited the passage through its territorial
sea of vessels transporting wastes, refuse, residues, or any other materials
likely to endanger the health of its population and to pollute its marine, air,
and land environment. 174 Furthermore, Haiti has declared that it will use
all means within its power to enforce this rule. 175 Similarly, coastal states
along the possible route of plutonium shipments from France to Japan in
1992, protested angrily, and some openly declared that they would prevent
176
such shipments through their territorial seas and EEZs.
The LOSC does not mandate or sanction the above legislations, declarations, claims, and measures. However, it is difficult to disapprove of
these actions. These coastal states are acting responsibly and protecting
162. Republic of Korea: Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Act: Law No. 3037
(promulgated Dec. 31, 1977), amended by Law No. 4986 (promulgated Dec. 6, 1995), 33
L. SEAs BULL. 45, 46 (1997).
163. Egypt: Declaration Concerning the Passage of Nuclear-Powered and Similar
Ships Through the Territorial Sea of Egypt, 3 L. SEAs BULL. 13 (1984) [hereinafter Egypt].
164. Oman: Declaration No. 3, on the Passage of Nuclear-Powered Ships and the Like
Through Omani Territorial Waters, 14 L. SEAs BULL. 8 (1989).
165. Iran, supra note 157, at 12.
166. Yemen: Declarations Made Upon the Convention, 25 L. SEAS BULL. 20 (1994)
[hereinafter Yemen].
167. Saudi Arabia, supra note 152, at 10.
168. Malaysia: Declaration Made Upon Ratification, published in LOSB, supra note
141, vol. 33, at 8 (1997).
169. Maldives, supra note 150, at 17.
170. Seychelles: Maritime Zones Act, 1999 (Act No. 2 of 1999), 48 L. SEAS BULL. 18,
22 (2002) [hereinafter Seychelles].
171. Romania: Act Concerning the Legal Regime of Internal Waters, the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Romania (Aug. 7, 1990), 19 L. SEAS BULL. 9, 11 (1991)
[hereinafter Romania].
172. Lithuania: Legislation on the Territorial Sea, 25 L. SEAS BULL. 75 (1994).
173. On September 5, 1986, the Khian Sea, a Liberian-registered vessel, set sail from
Philadelphia, wandering the oceans in search of a dumpsite for its cargo of approximately 14,000 tons of incinerator waste. After the Bahamas, Bermuda, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Guinea-Bissau, and the Netherlands Antilles turned it away, the
ship arrived at Gonaives, Haiti, in December 1987. It convinced the Haitian authorities
that it was carrying fertilizer. After the ship unleashed 4,000 tons of ash on the
Gonaives beach, the Haitian government ordered it to reload the waste and leave. The
Khian Sea left but without its noxious cargo. See Weinstein, supra note 124, at 147-49.
174. Haiti: Note Verbale Dated 18 February 1988 from the Ministry of the Interior,
Decentralization, the General Police Force and the Civil Service, Communicated to the
United Nations by a Letter Dated 29 February 1988, 11 L. SEAs BULL. 13 (1988).
175. Id.
176. Van Dyke, supra note 123, at 399.
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their legitimate interests by restricting ships that pose a grave risk of environmental degradation. This is especially true when coastal states derive
no benefit, direct or indirect, from the passage of such ships in their territorial waters.
C.

Restriction on Innocent Passage of Warships

As previously noted, many coastal states have imposed restrictions on
innocent passage of warships. For example, states have required prior notification and/or prior permission or authorization and limited the maximum number of warships navigating through their territorial waters.
Presently, Croatia, 17 7 Egypt, 178 Finland, 179 Guyana, 180 India,' 8 '
South Korea,' 8 2 Libya,18 3 Malta,' 8 4 Mauritius,' 8 5 and the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) i8 6 all require prior notification before a foreign warship can pass through its territorial waters. However, most of
these countries do not specify when a foreign warship must provide this
notification. Therefore, theoretically, a foreign warship could communicate its desire to pass just moments before the foreign ship enters that
country's territorial waters. However, Croatia and the former Yugoslavia
require notification at least twenty-four hours in advance while South
87
Korea requires three days' prior notification.'
88
Moreover, at present, Algeria,'
Antigua and Barbuda, i8 9 Ban19 2
19 1
190
Cambodia, 19 3 Cape Verde, 19 4
Burma,
Barbados,
gladesh,
19 5
1 96
China,
Congo (Brazzaville),
Grenada, 19 7 Iran, 198 Maldives, 19 9
177. Croatia, supra note 154, at 32.
178. Egypt, supra note 163, at 13.
179. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Republic of Korea: Enforcement Decree of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Act, Presidential Decree No. 9162 (Sept. 20, 1978), amended by Presidential Decree No.
13463 (Sept. 7, 1991), Presidential Decree No. 15133 (July 31, 1996), and Presidential
Decree No. 17803 (Dec. 18, 2002), 51 L. SEAs BULL. 88 (2003) [hereinafter Korea].
183. ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
184. See Malta, supra note 160, at 16.
185. ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
186. Yugoslavia: Act Concerning the Coastal Sea and the Continental Shelf (July 23,
1987), 18 L. SEAs BULL. 9 (1991) [hereinafter Yugoslavia].
187. See Croatia, supra note 154, at 32; Yugoslavia, supra note 186, at 9; Korea, supra
note 182, at 88.
188. Algeria: Declaration Made Upon Ratification, 31 L. SEAS BULL. 7 (1996).
189. See Antigua and Barbuda: Territorial Waters Act, 1982, Act No. 18 of Aug. 17.,
1982, 2 L. SE.s BULL. 1 (1983).
190. Bangladesh: Declaration Made Upon Ratification of the Convention, 46 L. SEAS
BULL. 14 (2001).

191. ROACH, supra note 13, at 266.
192. See Burma: Territorial Sea and Maritime Zones Law, 1977, Law No. 3 of Apr. 9,
1977, 2 L. SEAs BULL. 9 (1983).
193. ROACH, supra note 13, at 266.
194. See Cape Verde: Innocent Passage Through the Territorial Sea and Security Interests (Part II, Section 3, Subsection A), 1 L. SEAs BULL. 17 (1983).
195. China: Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (February 25, 1992),
21 L. SEAs BULL. 24 (1992).
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20 3
St. Vincent and the
Oman, 20 0 Pakistan, 2 0 Philippines, 20 2 Romania,
20 7
20 6
20 5
20 4
Sudan, 20 8
Lanka,
Sri
Somalia,
Seychelles,
Grenadines,
2 12
211
2 10
20 9
all require
and Yemen
Vietnam,
United Arab Emirates,
Syria,
prior permission or authorization for the passage of foreign warships in
their territorial waters. Albania requires special authorization for the pas2 13
The
sage of such ships, except in the circumstances of force majeure.
same
of
the
warships
of
foreign
number
the
restricts
former Yugoslavia
nationality passing through its territorial sea to a maximum of three at a
time. 2 14 Denmark also stipulates that simultaneous passage through the
"Great Belt or the Sound of more than three warships of the same 2national15
ity" is subject to prior notification through diplomatic channels.

Most coastal state legislations do not define "warship" and thus are
implicitly adopting the LOSC definition. Other countries have explicitly
incorporated a version of the LOSC definition in their legislations. For
example, a statute of the former Yugoslavia and Croatia contains a defini16
Meantion of warships that is not dissimilar to that found in the LOSC. 2
of
such
"vessels
as
naval
while, the Republic of Maldives defines warships
board
on
the
weapons
description that could be engaged in warfare due to
such vessels." 2 17 The express reference to weapons is not found in the
LOSC definition. Thus, the Republic of Maldives does not consider a warship, as defined under the LOSC, as a warship unless it has weapons.
Accordingly, the Maldivian definition is narrower in scope than that of the
LOSC.
The cited legislations, claims, and declarations of the various coastal
states indicate that these states do not recognize innocent passage of war196. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
197. See id.
198. See Iran, supra note 157, at 12.
199. See Maldives, supra note 150, at 17.
200. Oman: Declaration No. 2, On the Passage of Warships Through Omani Territorial Waters, 14 L. SEAs BULL. 8 (1989).
201. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
202. See id.
203. Romania, supra note 171, at 14.
204. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
205. Seychelles, supra note 170, at 21.
206. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. U.A.E., supra note 161, at 95.
211. See ROACH, supra note 13, at 267.
212. Yemen, supra note 166, at 20.
213. Decree on the Boundaries of the People's Republic of Albania (May 8, 1970),
reprinted in LIMITS IN THE SEAs, May 6, 1994, at 18 (1994).
214. Yugoslavia, supra note 186, at 12.
215. Denmark: Ordinance Governing the Admission of Foreign Warships and Military Aircraft to Danish Territory in Time of Peace (Apr. 16, 1999), 44 L. SEAS BULL. 52
(2001).
216. See Yugoslavia, supra note 186, at 9; Croatia, supra note 154, at 26; see also
LOSC, supra note 4, art. 29.
217. See Maldives, supra note 150, at 18.
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ships. The various restrictions violate the LOSC, which imposes no restrictions on warships, but it does not appear that these states will relax their
restrictions in the near future. 2 18 In fact, in 1999 Seychelles actually tight2 19
ened its 1977 requirement of prior notification and prior authorization.
Coastal states defend their actions by claiming that they are fighting
the maritime states to prevent maritime hegemony. 2 20 The United States
has been challenging these excessive restrictions through its Freedom 2 of
21
Navigation program established in 1979 by the Carter administration.
This program emphasizes the freedom of navigation provisions of the
LOSC 222 and maintains that "[u]nless these excessive claims are actively
' 2 23
It is arguable
opposed, the challenged rights will be effectively lost."

that acquiescence in the face of restrictions opens "the door for everincreasing restrictions. '22 4 The United States appears to be the only
nation that possesses the capability to effectively challenge unwarranted
restrictions. However, its persistent refusal to ratify the LOSC harms its
credibility to effectively challenge these restrictions.
Conclusion
Accepted state practice has reflected the exact scope of the right of
innocent passage. Although steeped in antiquity, the concept is as relevant
today as it was centuries ago. The international community has attempted
to settle the juridical nature of the right of innocent passage. However, the
complex nature of this right makes it difficult to design a permanent solution. Many coastal states are placing excessive limitations on25this right
2
while conveniently ignoring the pacta sunt servanda principle.
One thing is clear: the struggle between mare liberum and mare
clausum continues unabated. This disagreement will continue to shape the
development of the law of the sea and the right of innocent passage. If it
sank in troubled waters during the time of James Brown Scott, 2 26 recent

state practice suggests that Selden's Mare Clausum is well afloat, side by
side Grotius' Mare Liberum. Indeed, it is likely that the former may override the latter in the near future despite the provisions of the LOSC.
However, I suggest that states allow freedom of navigation prevail
because it is indispensable in our increasingly interdependent world. To
218. However, some coastal states, including, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Indonesia,
Poland, Sweden, and Turkey have relaxed their former restrictive laws and declarations
on innocent passage of warships. ROACH, supra note 13, at 258-80.
219. For the 1977 requirement, see ROACH, supra note 13, at 267; for the 1999
requirement, see Seychelles, supra note 170, at 18.
220. See Song, supra note 129, at 217.
221. ROACH, supra note 13, at 5.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Weinstein, supra note 124, at 139.
225. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that a party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty obligation).
226. See Scott, supra note 38.
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this end, states must streamline their domestic laws with the view of
becoming compliant with the LOSC. Nations must strive for uniformity of
state practice to encourage international cooperation and harmony and to
reduce the opportunity for violent confrontation. Unilateralism will not
do.

